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Executive Summary 
States are responsible for their breaches of international law. This memorandum provides a 
legal framework for advocacy aimed at holding States accountable to their legal obligations 
vis-à-vis the illegal Israeli settlements in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). 
Given the current context in which efforts are undertaken by many actors to end this illegal 
Israeli enterprise while the settlements continue to expand, the purpose of this memorandum 
is to raise awareness of the important implications of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
Advisory Opinion of 2004 and the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles).  
 
The ILC Articles lay out the customary legal rules for the conduct of State organs, public and 
even private entities and persons for which a State is responsible. This memorandum reviews 
the broad spectrum of Israeli actors involved, since 1967, in the development and 
maintenance of the settlements, supportive infrastructure and services, and the associated 
regime of Israeli laws, policies and practices that compose the “settlement enterprise.”1
 
 It 
concludes by finding that this settlement enterprise is institutionalised into the operations of 
all official organs, public and private entities and persons that make up the organisational 
fabric of the Israeli State and society. The memorandum illustrates how the conduct of these 
actors is attributable to the State under the rules of customary international law (ILC Articles 
4, 5 and 7 – 9), and that the State of Israel is, therefore, in addition to the individual actors, 
responsible for the entire unlawful settlement enterprise in the OPT. 
This memorandum also argues that the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004 is the most appropriate 
and authoritative legal framework for the analysis of the nature of the international breaches 
and the legal consequences resulting from Israel’s settlement enterprise. Many international 
and local actors continue to believe that the legal obligations of States vis-à-vis the illegal 
settlement enterprise, which has been pursued in the context of Israel’s prolonged occupation, 
are defined mainly by the humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 
(hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention). This memorandum draws attention to the fact that 
the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004 has established a much broader legal foundation for 
Israel’s and other States’ obligations, based not only on the Fourth Geneva Convention, but 
also on a range of human rights treaties, as well as on customary international law.  
 
The ICJ also recognised that Israel’s Wall and its associated legislative and regulatory regime 
are a component of the larger settlement enterprise in the OPT. The Court analysed the Israeli 
violations on this basis and found that, by constructing the Wall, Israel is in breach of:  
 
x the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force and the right to self-
determination of the Palestinian people, which are peremptory norms of customary 
international law, i.e., norms which are recognised to be binding on all States and 
from which no derogation is permitted, and,                                                         
1 A definition of the settlement enterprise is provided in paragraph 13. 
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x additional obligations under humanitarian and human rights law, including the 
prohibition on forced population transfer; the obligation to respect Palestinian private 
and public property; the obligation to refrain from introducing changes in government 
or institutions of the OPT that deprive the Palestinian population of the status and 
rights enshrined in the Fourth Geneva Convention; the obligation to respect 
Palestinian freedom of movement; and the obligation to protect the rights enshrined in 
the ICESCR and CRC, in particular the rights of Palestinians to work, health, 
education and an adequate standard of living. 
 
The Court also found that Israel’s violation of the right to self-determination of the 
Palestinian people, as well as some of the above violations of international humanitarian law, 
constitute Israeli violations of obligations erga omnes, which are owed by Israel to the entire 
international community and that all States have a legal interest and duty to protect. 
 
This memorandum highlights the manner in which the ICJ analyzed Israel’s breaches and 
applied the ILC Articles on state responsibility in the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004. It also 
outlines how the Court’s analysis and findings on the Wall can be applied to the much larger 
Israeli settlement enterprise as currently manifest in the OPT. The memorandum argues that 
the latter can be defined as a situation of serious breaches of peremptory norms of customary 
international law as codified in ILC Article 40. Under the ICJ’s analysis, the legal norms 
violated by Israel with its settlement enterprise are norms that are essential for the protection 
of Palestinians as individuals, as well as for protection of the collective right to self-
determination of the Palestinian people. Israel violates these norms by breaching, in a 
systematic manner, the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force, as well as the 
prohibitions on racial discrimination, apartheid and colonial domination. Israeli breaches of 
the former are composite acts (ILC Article 15), i.e., a situation of continuing breaches in 
which each single act or omission may be unlawful, but which is always unlawful in the 
aggregate. This argument is supported by the findings of consecutive UN Special Rapporteurs 
on the situation of human rights in the OPT who have characterised Israel’s regime of 
occupation, including the settlements, as “a regime of prolonged occupation with features of 
colonialism and apartheid.”2
 
 The memorandum concludes that Israel’s serious breaches 
resulting from the settlement enterprise in the OPT trigger the heightened legal responsibility 
of all States under customary international law, as set out in the ILC Articles and affirmed in 
the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004. 
For Israel, the responsible State, the following legal obligations arise: 
x to perform the obligations breached (ILC Article 29);  
x to cease  the settlement enterprise in the OPT and to offer appropriate assurances and 
guarantees of non-repetition, including the dismantlement of the settlements and 
related infrastructure (ILC Article 30); and,  
x to make full reparation for all damage caused through restitution, compensation and 
satisfaction, including the return of displaced persons and property seized (ILC 
Articles 31 – 39). The ICJ Opinion reaffirms the principle that restitution is the                                                         
2 See paragraphs 13 – 16. 
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primary form of reparation, particularly where breaches are of a continuing and 
serious character and violate peremptory norms under customary international law.3
 
  
All other States, individually and when acting in groups, have the legal obligations set out in 
ILC Article 41. All States are to take action as required in order to perform these obligations. 
When States fail to perform their legal obligations vis-à-vis Israel’s settlement enterprise, 
these States become themselves responsible for internationally wrongful conduct. In this case, 
States incur the additional obligations to cease their breach and to make reparation for 
damage caused. 
 
 The following legal obligations arise for all States under customary international law as 
codified in ILC Article 41: 
x to perform their obligations under treaties; 
x to cooperate to bring to an end Israel’s serious breaches and to act, separately and 
jointly to counteract the effect of these breaches; and, 
x not to recognise, i.e., give legal sanction to, the illegal situation created by Israel, nor 
to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.  
 
These obligations are discussed in detail in Section IV of this memorandum. The obligation 
not to give legal sanction to Israel’s unlawful settlement enterprise refers both to formal 
recognition as well as to acts implying such recognition. In addition, the obligation not to 
render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation arises because of the continuing and 
composite character of Israel’s serious breaches; it extends beyond aid and assistance in the 
commission of the breach itself to the maintenance of the situation created by the breach. A 
necessary implication of the above is that all governments are obliged to ensure that State 
organs, public and private entities and persons whose activities attributable to the State under 
international law do not violate these obligations. 
 
The ILC Articles also codify the rules to be observed in the implementation of state 
responsibility, as well as some of the mechanisms which States can and should use in order to 
perform their legal obligations vis-à-vis Israel’s serious breaches. Implementation of state 
responsibility begins with a formal notice of claim (ILC Article 43). Usually, the right to 
invoke claims against another State for a wrongful act is reserved for the injured State (ILC 
Article 42). However, in situations of a serious breach of a peremptory norm, such as the 
situation created by Israel’s settlement enterprise in the OPT, all States are presumed injured 
or affected, and, are therefore, entitled to act individually or collectively on behalf of the 
injured State and/or the victims (ILC Article 48). Moreover, since Israel, the responsible 
State, has failed to comply with its obligation of cessation and reparation, it is lawful for any 
injured party, including any affected State, to take “countermeasures” (Article 54). 
Countermeasures (reprisals, sanctions) are defined as actions of a State that would be 
unlawful if they were not taken in response to an internationally wrongful act and in order to 
remedy the breach of an obligation (ILC Article 49). Countermeasures must comply with the 
rules for threat or use of force in the UN Charter; respect fundamental human rights,                                                         
3 See paragraph 17-18 with references to the ICJ’s argument and decision. 
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humanitarian obligations and peremptory norms (ILC Article 50); and be proportional (ILC 
Article 51).  
 
The final section of the memorandum reviews existing State practice vis-à-vis Israel’s 
settlement enterprise in the OPT based on facts compiled by local and international actors. It 
is noted briefly that States have not ensured Israel’s compliance with the provisions of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention as stipulated in the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004, and have failed 
to meet additional special obligations arising from other treaties. The memorandum also finds 
that: 
x many States are, in fact, complicit through the provision of unlawful recognition, aid 
or assistance in the maintenance of the illegal situation created by Israel in the OPT. 
Such States are to cease and remedy their internationally wrongful conduct.  
 
x All States have yet to adopt the measures they can and should take in order to perform 
their legal obligations under customary international law, as set out in the ILC 
Articles. No State has, for example, presented a formal claim to Israel for cessation of 
its serious breaches and for reparation for the Palestinian victims. No State, or group 
of States, has taken appropriate countermeasures (sanctions) under the terms of ILC 
Article 54. States have cooperated in the peace process and the delivery of aid to the 
Palestinian people in the OPT, but such cooperation has been guided by the terms of 
the Oslo Accords, which protect Israeli interests and sideline international law. 
Consequently, all States have ignored their obligation to cooperate to end Israel’s 
serious breaches.  
 
In light of the above, the memorandum concludes that all States have failed, in a number of 
critical ways, to perform their legal obligations under customary international law, as codified 
in ILC Article 41 and affirmed in the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004. States have, thus, failed 
to end Israel’s illegal settlement enterprise, which undermines the human rights of the 
Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination. States that fail to recognize and 
perform these obligations, or are complicit with Israel’s serious breaches, incur the additional 
obligation to cease all unlawful recognition, aid or assistance, and to make reparation. 
However, when powerful States do not cease their wrongful conduct, other States lack the 
power and mechanisms to procure performance of this obligation from such States. 
Consequently, no State is held accountable for conducting “business as usual” with Israel. 
The resulting international climate of lawlessness and complicity is the environment that 
provides Israel with impunity and in which Israel’s settlement enterprise thrives.   
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Introduction 
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a legal framework for advocacy aimed at 
holding States accountable to their legal obligations regarding Israel’s violations of 
international law. The memorandum focuses on the responsibility of States in connection with 
Israel’s illegal Jewish settlement enterprise in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), 
or, more precisely, in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. This particular 
focus was chosen because of the broad international consensus that Israeli settlements in the 
OPT are illegal; the grave adverse impact of the settlements on the Palestinian people; and the 
large number of actors engaged in efforts to end this Israeli enterprise -- from States acting in 
their individual and collective capacity to humanitarian and development organisations and 
human rights campaigners.  
 
Given the current context in which these settlements continue to expand despite the efforts of 
many actors, the aim of this memorandum is to raise awareness about the fact that all States 
have specific legal obligations under customary international law, in addition to the 
obligations arising from international humanitarian and human rights treaties. The paper 
analyses how the rules of state responsibility in customary international law shed light on 
measures that can be taken by States in order to fulfil their legal obligations in a manner that 
is not only lawful, but also an appropriate and effective response to Israel’s illegal settlement 
enterprise.   
 
The legal analysis in this memorandum  rests on the International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter  ILC Articles), 
which lay out the general rules concerning the legal obligations of States when international 
law is violated. 4 The general rules codified in the ILC Articles are widely considered to 
reflect current customary international law. They are derived from a comprehensive study of 
state responsibility as incorporated into the UN Charter and treaties, referred to and 
interpreted by the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) and other international 
tribunals, and practiced by States in UN initiatives and in their conduct of bilateral and 
multilateral relations.5 The second important source of analysis in this memo is the ICJ 
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied 
Palestinian Territory of 9 July 2004 (hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004).6
                                                        4 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the International Law 
Commission at its 53rd session, in 2001, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s 
report covering the work of that session (A/56/10). The Draft Articles were commended to the attention of 
governments in UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 2001. 
  Although 
ICJ advisory opinions have no technical force, States cannot ignore the fundamental and 
binding rules of international law that the Court has underlined. Moreover, the UN General 
Assembly, having requested and subsequently endorsed the Advisory Opinion, is bound to 
cooperate with the Court and to give effect to its recommendations. The Advisory Opinion is 
5 The International Law Commission uses the term “general international law.” Whereas customary law and 
general international law are sometimes distinguished, with the latter ranking higher in the hierarchy of 
international law, the ILC Articles may be described, for the sake of simplicity, as codification of customary 
international law.   
6 Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=5a&case=131&code=mwp&p3=4 
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important, because it constitutes the most relevant  legal opinion from the most authoritative 
international legal tribunal about both the nature of Israel’s international law breaches 
resulting from its settlement enterprise in the OPT, and the way in which the general rules of 
state responsibility are to be applied to this particular situation. Although non-binding in and 
of itself, the ICJ Advisory Opinion gives the most authoritative review of what obligations 
exist under customary law relevant to the key questions relating to the Israeli settlement 
enterprise that has been rendered to date.7
 
  
The first section of this memorandum addresses the apparent uncertainty among some 
humanitarian and human rights actors about whether Israel, the State, is legally responsible 
for the  settlement activity in the OPT, or whether responsibility is limited to the institutions, 
businesses and persons operating in these settlements. It explains the broad definition of the 
State in customary international law as codified in the ILC Articles, and it demonstrates how 
the activities of a multitude of official Israeli organs, public and even private entities and 
persons in establishing and expanding settlements in the OPT are attributable to the State of 
Israel, and that the State of Israel is, therefore, responsible and accountable.   
 
The second section defines Israel’s settlement enterprise in the OPT and takes a closer look at 
the nature and legal consequences of related Israeli international law violations. It reviews the 
Israeli breaches identified in the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004 in connection with the Wall, 
and explains how these are not only violations of international humanitarian and human rights 
treaties, but also serious breaches of peremptory norms and obligations erga omnes under 
customary international law. It explains the meaning and important legal consequences of this 
finding for the responsibility of all States. The section ends with a tentative projection of the 
implications of the ICJ’s analysis as applied to Israel’s entire settlement enterprise, rather than 
only to the construction of the Wall and its associated regime.   
 
Sections three and four discuss content and implementation of State responsibility. The legal 
obligations of the responsible State, Israel, are briefly summarized in the third section. The 
fourth section deals with the responsibility of other States in connection with Israel’s serious 
breaches. It discusses their legal obligations under customary international law, as well as 
measures that all States can and should take, in order to fulfil these obligations.  
 
The last section reviews how other States have responded to Israel’s illegal settlement 
enterprise in practice. It shows that States have so far failed to perform their own legal 
obligations, and that they have not taken the measures they are required to adopt under 
customary international law, in order to end the unlawful situation created by Israel in the                                                         
7 Although there is significant academic debate about whether the ICJ’s analysis of the relevant international 
treaty and customary law rules is ‘correct,’ the Opinion remains for now the consensus of what the justices on 
the ICJ perceive the state of the law to be. For a review of this debate, see, “Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” in American Journal of International Law, 99 
A.J.I.L. 1; The American Society of International Law, January 2005. See also, Susan Akram and Michael Lynk, 
“The Wall and the Law: A Tale of Two Judgments”, in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2006; and, 
Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “The Responsibility of the Political Organs of the UN for Palestine in Light of the ICJ’s 
Wall Opinion”, in Marcelo G. Kohen (ed.), Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution through 
International Law, Liber Amicorum Lucius Caflisch (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), pp. 1095-1119.  
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OPT. A quick guide to customary international law on state responsibility as codified in the 
ILC Articles is attached as an Annex.  
 
A final note on scope and terminology: legal issues not directly related to the Israeli 
settlement enterprise in the OPT, such as the institutionalized racial discrimination of the 
1948 Palestinian refugees and Palestinian citizens of Israel, the illegal Israeli closure 
(blockade) of the occupied Gaza Strip, or unlawful Israeli (conduct in) military operations or 
warfare, such as in the Gaza Strip in 2008/9 and in Lebanon in 2006, are beyond the scope of 
this paper and will not be addressed.  
 
It is important to emphasize that the focus of this memo is on the responsibility of all States in 
connection with the violations of international law resulting from Israel’s settlement 
enterprise in the OPT. The memo, therefore, does not cover the full scope of obligations owed 
to the Palestinian people by States and the United Nations.8
 
  Moreover, the precise focus is on 
state responsibility in customary international law as codified in the ILC Articles. There are 
many other important issues of responsibility which are beyond the scope of this paper, 
including the special legal obligations of States and inter-state organizations arising from 
treaties, such as the Fourth Geneva Convention and human rights conventions, or issues 
pertaining to non-state entities and persons, such as the responsibility of corporations and 
individuals for complicity in war crimes and serious human rights abuses committed in 
connection with Israel’s settlement enterprise. Brief references to some of these issues are 
included in the paper where appropriate. 
To be consistent with common English language usage and the terminology adopted by the 
United Nations, this paper refers to Israeli “settlements” and “the Wall” in the OPT. These 
neutral and descriptive terms do not per se indicate illegal activity; however, the unlawful 
character of both is analyzed and explained in the second section of the paper.9
 
 Moreover, the 
term “settlement enterprise” is used throughout this paper because it incorporates the full 
scope of the policies and practices that comprise Israel’s illegal settlement regime in the OPT 
in a more appropriate manner than other commonly used terms, such as “settlements” or 
“settlement activities.” A tentative definition of the unlawful Israeli “settlement enterprise” is 
provided in paragraph 13. 
                                                        
8 Additional specific obligations arise, for example, for all States from the obligation to protect the right of self-
determination of the Palestinian people, and for the United Nations from the “permanent responsibility towards 
the question of Palestine until the question is resolved in all its aspects in a satisfactory manner in accordance 
with international legitimacy.” (GA Res. 57/107 of 3 December 2002, cited in the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004 
at para. 49.) 
9 The term “colonies” designates more appropriately the unlawful character of Israel’s settlements in the OPT. 
This is, in fact, the terminology used in many other languages; however, it is rarely used in English and has not 
been adopted by the UN. The terms “Annexation Wall”, “Apartheid Wall” or “Separation Wall” are often used 
in order to give expression to the illegal purpose and effect. In this paper, the plain term “the Wall” is used for 
easier reading. The latter is consistent with the language of the ICJ and designates the same meaning.  
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I. Who are “The Settlers”?  
On the attribution of the illegal settlement enterprise to the State of 
Israel in international law 
 
ILC Article 1: 
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of 
that State. 
 
ILC Article 2: 
A State is responsible for internationally wrongful conduct, if the particular conduct:  
(i) is attributable to the State under international law; and,  
(ii)  constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that State.   
 
1. The international consensus about the unlawfulness of Israeli settlements in the OPT has 
been affirmed by the ICJ, which stated unanimously and unambiguously that these Israeli 
settlements have been established in breach of international law.10 Few references exist to the 
legal debate about whether the State of Israel is legally responsible for these settlements, most 
likely because the answer appears to be self-evident: States and the UN, including its Security 
Council, have held the State of Israel accountable at least since 1971,11 and Israeli 
governments have never disputed being in charge. To the contrary, Israel officially announced 
the permanent annexation of occupied East Jerusalem in 1980, and settlement of its  Jewish 
population in the OPT through the development of so-called settlement blocks has remained 
the State’s declared policy until today, in particular in East Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley.12
                                                        
10 ICJ 2004 at para 120. Judge Buergenthal, who disagreed with the majority of the ICJ judges on procedural and 
some substantial issues, accepted the illegality of settlements in his separate Declaration (para. 9). 
 
On the one hand, the responsibility of the State of Israel for the illegal settlements appears, 
thus, to be widely recognised. On the other hand, however, conventional wisdom considers 
these settlements to be largely the outcome of the activities of “the settlers” themselves. The 
“settlers” are seen primarily as persons and groups, including many religious fundamentalists, 
11 On relevant UN Security Council resolutions, see below, paragraph 10. 
12 For a historical overview of official Israeli settlement policy, see, for example, Btselem, at: 
http://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/200205_land_grab. Initially, Israeli Labour governments 
justified Jewish settlement in the OPT as a measure required for reasons of “national security,” i.e., the need to 
move its military defence lines to the east, outside the State territory which was considered to be “too small.”  
Since the 1993 Oslo accords, Israeli governments have argued in international relations that the settlements must 
be expanded, in particular the areas of existing settlement blocks, in order to accommodate the natural growth of 
the settler population, that expansion is limited to that purpose, and that measures which limit the rights of the 
Palestinian population are necessary for “security reasons,” i.e., the need to protect the  population in the 
settlements in the OPT and in Israel. An exception is the case of occupied East Jerusalem, where Israeli officials 
justify Jewish settlement for ideological reasons. For example: “Jerusalem is not a settlement; Jerusalem is the 
capital of the State of Israel. Israel has never restricted itself regarding any kind of building in the city ... Israel 
sees no connection between the peace process and the planning and building policy in Jerusalem, something that 
hasn’t changed for the past 40 years.” (Attila Somfalvi, “PM responds to Obama: Jerusalem not a settlement,” 
Yediot Aharanot, 10 November 2010). Domestically, Israeli officials have always promoted Jewish settlement in 
the OPT for ideological reasons, i.e., the inherent “right” of the “Jewish people” to “redeem” or settle in all of 
Eretz Israel, i.e., in Israel and in the OPT.  
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or self-defined ‘pioneers’, who operate in the OPT with unclear connections to the State of 
Israel. In the popular view, Israel is not perceived as primarily responsible --if at all-- for their 
actions. This section revisits the multitude and broad spectrum of Israeli state organs, public 
and private entities involved in the settlement enterprise, and it explains how the settlement 
activities of these state and non-state actors are attributable to the State of Israel in customary 
international law.  
 
2. Conduct, including a breach of an international obligation, is attributable to 
the State under international law if it is committed by an organ of that State, or by an 
entity or person empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority (ILC Article 
4). Organs of the State are defined broadly as all the individual or collective entities that  
constitute the organisation of the State and act on its behalf under the State’s internal law. 
State organs thus include not only the particular organs of government authorised to enter into 
commitments on behalf of the State, such as ministries of central government, but the entire 
range of legislative, judicial and executive entities at all levels, including provincial and local 
authorities.13
 
  Entities empowered by the State to exercise elements of governmental authority 
include public corporations, para-statal and semi-public entities, former state-owned 
corporations, and even private companies, to the extent that they exercise public or 
regulatory functions (ILC Article 5).  
3. Israeli governments, including the prime minister’s office and inter-ministerial 
committees, the Israeli military, as well as the Jewish Agency (JA) and the World Zionist 
Organization (WZO) and affiliates, which are private entities with public status in Israel,14 
have played a pivotal role in the strategic and operational planning of Jewish  settlements in 
the OPT, in particular in its early stages. These organs and their specialized departments and 
experts have mapped Palestinian land allocated for confiscation, identified suitable locations 
for settlements, supported their construction, and facilitated populating them with Jewish 
Israeli settlers.15 Providing legal justification for this settlement enterprise, the Israeli 
parliament (Knesset) and the courts, in particular the Israeli High Court of Justice, have 
passed over the years the required legislation and jurisprudence.16                                                        
13 ILC Article 4, comment 5. 
 The combined activities of 
14 Until 1992, the settlement divisions of the JA and WZO operated under joint administration. In 1993, the 
WZO settlement division was separated based on the decision of the Israeli government, in order to develop 
Jewish settlement in the OPT in the new context created by the Oslo accords. The WZO division also develops 
Jewish settlement of the occupied Syrian Golan Heights and, since 2004, also in the Galilee and Naqab (Negev), 
which are the two main Palestinian-populated areas in Israel. On the particular legal status and role of the JA, 
WZO and its affiliates, including the Jewish National Fund (JNF), see, W. Thomas Mallison, Jr., “The Zionist-
Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute the ‘Jewish People’ Entity and Confer Membership in It: Appraisal in 
Public International Law,” 32 The George Washington Law Review 5 (1964). See also, Joseph Schechla, 
“’Jewish Nationality’, ‘National Institutions’ and Institutionalized Dispossession”, in al-Majdal magazine, issue 
no. 24 (Winter 2004), Badil. 
15 On the settlement activities of these actors in the period between 1967 and the early 1980s, see, Meron 
Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project; A Survey of Israel’s Policies, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, Washington and London, 1984. See also, Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West 
Bank, B’tselem, 2002.  
16 Concerning Israeli legislation and jurisprudence of Israeli courts, see, Raja Shehadeh: “Some Legal Aspects of 
Israeli Land Policy in the Occupied Territories”, in Erik Fosse, Ebba Wergeland and Ibrahim Abu -Lughod 
(eds.), Arab Studies Quarterly: Israel and the Question of Palestine, Vol. 7, 2 & 3, Nov. 1985; p. 42 – 61; and, 
John Reynols, Legitimizing the Illegitimate, Al Haq, at: http://www.alhaq.org/publications/publications-
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the above have been instrumental for the confiscation of public and private Palestinian land, 
the suppression of Palestinian resistance to dispossession, the declaration of confiscated land 
as ‘Israel Land’ (state land), its transfer to the Israel Land Authority, and the allocation of 
such land to the settlement regional and local councils operating in the OPT.17 A 2005 official 
Israeli report18
 
 names the following organs and entities as those primarily driving settlement 
expansion in more recent times: the Ministry of Construction and Housing; the Ministry of 
Defense, including the Minister’s Assistant on Settlement Affairs; the Israeli military and its 
“Civil Administration” in the OPT; regional and local authorities; and, the Settlement 
Division of the WZO whose activities are financed by the Israeli State budget. 
4. Between 1967 and 2010, at least 17 billion USD in public funds were channelled through 
municipal authorities, the Ministry of Construction and Housing and the Ministry of 
National Infrastructure to 135 Israeli settlements in the OPT (excluding East Jerusalem). 
These funds were used to develop the infrastructure and services of 868 public facilities 
(kindergartens, schools, health services, synagogues) and 904 private businesses (shopping 
centers and industry). 19 Additional economic incentives provided by the State of Israel to the 
settlers in the OPT include income tax reductions (until 2003) by the Ministry of Finance; 
land at reduced cost, privileged housing loans and grants by the Ministry of Construction 
and Housing; land leases at reduced cost by the Israel Land Authority; incentives for 
teachers and subsidised transportation to schools by the Ministry of Education; as well as 
grants for private investors, development of infrastructure for industrial zones, and 
indemnification for loss of income (resulting from customs duties imposed on settlement 
produce by EU countries) by the Ministries of Industry and Trade and Tourism.20
 
  
5. All of the above Israeli State organs and empowered entities pursue Jewish  
settlement in the OPT as a matter of operational routine; they cooperate with, contract 
or subsidise a wide array of other (partially state-owned) public and private actors to 
assist with certain public or regulatory functions.21                                                                                                                                                                             
index/item/legitimising-the-illegitimate
 Examples include Israel’s national 
. See also, David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme 
Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories, State University of New York Press, 2002. 
17 Settlement local and regional councils in the OPT are part of Israel’s municipal system. Israel has established 
6 regional councils in the occupied West Bank: Gush Etzion, Har Hevron, Matte Benyamin, Megilot (Dead Sea), 
Shomron and Biq’at HaYarden (Jordan Valley). Together with Israel’s Jerusalem municipality, these local and 
regional councils administer approximately 50 per cent of the land in the occupied West Bank. They operate as a 
parallel system of Israeli local government that is separate from the indigenous Palestinian system of local 
government, including districts, municipalities and local councils. For sources on this, as well as other factual 
findings which support the argument made here, see below, paragraph 13. 
18 Talya Sasson, “Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts”, Office of the Prime Minister of Israel, 2005. For 
the official summary, see: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Law/Legal+Issues+and+Rulings/Summary+of+Opinion+Concerning+
Unauthorized+Outposts+-+Talya+Sason+Adv.htm  
19 Macro Center for Political Economics, project “Settlement Encyclopedia” at: 
http://www.macro.org.il/settlements-en.html. See also, Chaim Levinson, “Settlements have cost Israel $17 
billion, study finds”, in Haaretz, 23 March 2010.  
20 B’Tselem, Encouragement of Migration to the Settlements, 6 May 2010. 
21 In order to be attributable to the State, the conduct of these public and private actors must be related to a 
governmental authority, which is conferred to them by law. See, ILC Article 5, comment 1 and 2. In the context 
of Israel’s settlement enterprise in the OPT, this means that the specific link of the settlement activities of public 
and private actors with the State, i.e., their legal authorisation and public or regulatory function, must be 
established on a case-by-case basis. Activities which are attributable to the State may be related, for example, to 
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water company Mekorot, a major player in the discriminatory supply of water to the Israeli 
settlements and Palestinian communities in the OPT, Israeli banks, postal authorities, 
academic institutions and the Israeli labor union (Histadrut). 22 Also included are (semi) 
public and private Israeli security, trade and export companies, such as Elbit, Agrexco and 
Mehadrin, and businesses and associations providing services essential for the maintenance 
and development of the settlements, including construction, transport, supply and services  in  
health, education, culture and sports.23  Private Israeli security companies operating in Israeli 
projects in the OPT, such as G4S Israel, for example, are contracted to perform tasks that 
were traditionally executed by the Israeli security forces, such as the provision of equipment 
and services for the incarceration of Palestinians or the operation of checkpoints and the 
police headquarters in occupied Jerusalem, while IT companies like “EDS Israel”, a local 
subsidiary of Hewlett-Packard, provide and maintain surveillance and other security-related 
technology for the Israeli army and settlements. Israeli banks, for example, control the 
Palestinian banking market and provide the financial infrastructure and services for all 
settlement activity of state organs, public and private entities, and individuals.24
 
  
The conduct of all of these State organs and empowered entities in connection with the  
settlement enterprise in the OPT is attributable to the State of Israel under international 
law, when they pursue their authorised function, and also when they act in excess or 
contravention of the instructions given by the State (ILC Article 7).25 Examples of the 
latter are harassment and acts of violence against the Palestinian population by soldiers and 
private security personnel, and the conduct of the ministries, military, local authorities and the 
WZO who, according to the official investigation of 2005, have provided funding, 
infrastructure and services to approximately 100 new settlements (so-called outposts) without 
governmental authorisation.26
                                                                                                                                                                             
functions of security or the control of property and markets, the movement of persons and goods, extraction of 
natural resources and the allocation/regulation of the distribution of natural resources, goods and services. 
 The responsibility of the State for these new “outpost” 
settlements, which have been established since 2000, allegedly on the private initiative of 
Israeli settlers, also arises from their retroactive adoption by the State (ILC Article 11). These 
settlements have, with very few exceptions, not been dismantled, and public services continue 
22 See, for example, www.hityashvut.org.il/PageCat.asp?id=16 (in Hebrew only), the WZO webpage which 
explains that the WZO Settlement Division routinely cooperates with: the Office of the Prime Minister; the 
Ministries of Construction and Housing, Infrastructure, Absorption, Education, Agriculture, Tourism, Industry 
and Trade, Defence, Labour and Welfare; regional and local councils; the Jewish National Fund (JNF); the 
Water Authority (Mekorot); ‘Hamamot Tayarut’ (an agency that supports the development of tourist sites); the 
Center for Assistance and Promotion of Business (MASKIM); the Israel Land Authority/Abandoned Property in 
Yehuda and Shomron; academic  institutions and NGOs; the Nature Reserves and National Parks Authority; the 
Authority of Small Business Enterprises; and the SELA Administration for Assistance to the Settlers from the 
Gaza Strip.  
23 On public transport, see: http://mondoweiss.net/2012/07/what-israeli-settlement-bus-routes-teach-us-about-
the-occupation.html On Israeli academic and cultural institutions, see, Uri Yacobi Keller, Academic Boycott of 
Israel and the complicity of Israeli Academic Institutions in Occupation of Palestinian Territories, AIC, 2009. 
On business companies, see: www.whoprofits.org; and www.business-humanrights.org (country page on Israeli 
and the OPT). 
24 See, Coalition of Women for Peace, Financing the Israeli Occupation (October 2010), at: 
www.whoprofits.org/sites/default/files/WhoProfits-IsraeliBanks2010.pdf  
25 In order to be attributable to the State, conduct in excess or contravention of instructions must be “official”, 
i.e., performed in the context of the public function they are empowered to perform, and not be a “private” act. 
This is to be established on a case-by-case basis. See, ILC Article 7, comment 7 and 8. 
26 Talya Sasson, 2005 (supra, note 18). 
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to be provided to them. An option for official recognition has been granted by government to 
some. The existence of other “outposts” appears to be de facto acknowledged by the State, 
while official debate is underway about the appropriate way to achieve their legalisation.27
 
 
6. Finally, also attributable to the State of Israel is the conduct of private settlers  
and groups of settlers who are directed, controlled or act on the instructions of the State 
(ILC Article 8),28 or who de facto exercise elements of governmental authority in the 
absence or default of the official authorities (ILC Article 9).29 One example of such 
conduct is the destruction and expropriation of Palestinian public and private property in 
occupied East Jerusalem for archaeological excavations and Jewish tourism development, 
which have been “outsourced” by Israeli authorities to the private Jewish settler organisation 
El’ad.30 Another example are acts of settler violence committed by paramilitary “settlement 
guards” or private settler militias in order to control, punish, or forcibly relocate the 
Palestinian population.31 Such regular acts as armed raids against communities, the 
destruction of Palestinian orchards or the burning of mosques by settlers normally enjoy 
impunity. Approximately 78 per cent of cases of violence against Palestinians, and 93 per 
cent of cases of damage to property, have been closed on grounds suggesting that 
investigations were not competently conducted. In 90 per cent of complaints filed against 
settlers for acts of violence, investigation was closed because files were lost or due to other 
investigatory shortcomings.32
 
 Such systematic lack of due diligence and impunity suggest that 
the unlawful private conduct is sanctioned or endorsed by the Israeli authorities. 
7. In light of the above, the settlements are not merely the work of “the settlers” in the OPT, 
or of Israeli governments and their political and demographic strategies alone. Implemented 
in the context of Israel’s 45-year-old occupation, the settlement enterprise is largely the 
outcome of the operational routine of all those organs, entities and persons that constitute                                                         
27 See, for example, Barak Ravid, Jonathan Lis and Oz Rosenberg, “Netanyahu: Bill legalizing Ulpana 
neighbourhood would harm settlement construction. Right wingers propose bill that would authorize settlement 
construction on privately owned Palestinian land; Ministers Yishai, Lieberman say they support the bill”, 
Haaretz, 4 June 2012; and, David Kretzmer, “Bombshell for the settlement enterprise in Levy report. The far-
reaching consequences of the Levy report mean Israeli must either recognize that the legal system in the West 
Bank resembles apartheid - or extend political rights for all,” Haaretz, 10 July 2012. See also, Amnesty 
International, Enduring Occupation. Palestinians Under Siege in the West Bank, 2007 p. 18; and, B’tselem, By 
Hook and by Crook. Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank, 2010, p. 19. 
28 This was confirmed by the International Court of Justice. See, ICJ Reports 43 at 207-211 (genocide case 
2007). 
29 Failure of the State to prevent unlawful acts of its citizens, or to protect the occupied population, for example 
through lack of due diligence, invokes the responsibility of the State. However, proof of a more direct link with 
State organs is required to make the unlawful private acts themselves attributable to the State. Such links are, for 
example, the supply of training, weapons, other support by official Israeli organs, evidence of the fact that the 
leaders of such private settler groups are also government officials who are involved in official planning and 
decision making, or evidence of official endorsement/retroactive adoption of these unlawful acts. See, C. 
Chinkin, “State Responsibility in International Law: A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension”, 10 European 
Journal of International Law 2 (1999), p. 475-477; and, G. Townsend, “State responsibility for acts of de facto 
agents”, 14 Arizona Journal of International Law 635 (1997) 673-676. See also, I. Brownlie, System of the Law 
of Nations, State Responsibility, Part I (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986) 161. 
30 See, for example, EU Heads of Mission Jerusalem Report 2011 (para. 24). 
31 See, for example, OCHA-OPT “Fact Sheet on Israeli Settler Violence in the West Bank”, November 2011, at: 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_settler_violence_FactSheet_October_2011_english.pdf 32 Yesh Din, A Semblance of Law: Law enforcement upon Israeli citizens in the West Bank, June 2006. 
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the organisational fabric of the Israeli State and society. Whereas all of those involved are 
individually responsible for their acts, and may be held legally accountable,33
 
 most of these 
acts are also attributable to the State of Israel, and that State is, therefore, responsible 
under international law.  
This conclusion is, moreover, supported by the fact that the State of Israel and Israeli non-
state actors involved in the settlement enterprise share the same ideology that provides its 
conceptual underpinning: Zionism, which is the official ideology of the State incorporated 
into Israeli law, holds that the “Jewish people” have a “natural right to its homeland” in 
“Eretz Israel”, i.e., pre-1967 Israel and the OPT. In this context, Jewish settlement of the OPT 
is widely considered to be an effort to “make up for what was not accomplished in 1948” in 
order to complete the “Zionist mission”.34 In the words of the current head of the WZO 
Settlement Division, for example, “the re-establishment of the people of Israel in its homeland 
is directly linked to the practice of settlement which has determined the borders of the State, 
the character of its society, and the economic capacity and security of the State.”35
 
  
 
II. The nature of Israel’s international law breaches: 
On the situation of serious breaches of peremptory norms created by 
Israel’s settlement enterprise 
  
8. International law on state responsibility as codified in the ILC Articles lays out the general 
rules on the obligations of States when international law is violated; it does not provide rules 
for determining the specific violations of a State that result in such responsibility. Rules for 
the latter are provided by international humanitarian and human rights law. Therefore, this 
section revisits the 2004 ICJ Advisory Opinion, which examined Israel’s obligations under 
international humanitarian and human rights law, identified the violations resulting from the 
construction of the Wall in the OPT and applied the ILC Articles to determine the legal 
consequences for the State of Israel and other States.36
 
 
With regard to Israel’s obligations, the ICJ restated that the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip remain occupied territory and that the State of Israel continues 
to have the status of Occupying Power.37 It unanimously affirmed that the right to self-
determination of the Palestinian people is universally recognised,38
                                                        
33 See below, Section II, paragraph 16. 
 and that Israel, as the 
Occupying Power, is bound  by customary international law and by the humanitarian and 
34 See, for example, Tom Segev, 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East, 
Metropolitan Books, 2007. Under the terms of Zionist ideology and the law of the State of Israel, the “Jewish 
people,” or the “People of Israel”, designates Jewish persons worldwide. 
35 Statement by the Head of the WZO Settlement Division published on the WZO website (in Hebrew only; last  
visited: January 2012) 
36 The ICJ also made explicit reference to the ILC Articles. See, for example, ICJ 2004 at para. 140 and 150. 
37 Ibid, para. 78.  
38 Ibid, para. 118. 
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human rights treaties it has ratified with respect to the OPT.39
 
 Most important for the issues 
examined in this memorandum, the ICJ recognised that the Wall and the associated 
legislative and regulatory regime are a component of the larger Israeli settlement 
enterprise, and it analysed the Israeli violations resulting from the construction of the 
Wall on this basis. The ICJ’s findings regarding the nature of Israel’s breaches and the 
particular manner in which the Court applied the ILC Articles (see paragraph 10 – 12) 
confirm beyond doubt that the ICJ considered Israel to be in serious breach of 
peremptory norms of customary international law (see paragraph 10 - 12).  
9. Peremptory norms are defined as norms of customary international law that are accepted 
and recognised as binding by the international community as a whole, and from which no 
derogation is permitted.40  These norms are obligations erga omnes, because they are owed to 
the entire international community. Serious breaches of peremptory norms41
a) norms of essential importance for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
such as the prohibition of aggression; 
 may also amount 
to international crimes when they involve, inter alia, aggression, genocide or crimes against 
humanity. Although there is uncertainty about which norms constitute peremptory norms, it is 
generally accepted that the following constitute such norms: 
b) norms of essential importance for safeguarding the right to self-determination of 
peoples, such as the prohibition on the acquisition of sovereignty over territory by 
force or the establishment/maintenance of colonial domination; 
c) norms of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those 
prohibiting slavery, genocide, racial discrimination, apartheid, other crimes against 
humanity and torture. 42
 
 
10. In examining the Wall in the broader context of Israel’s illegal settlement enterprise in 
 the OPT, the ICJ revisited and acknowledged the findings reflected in a series of UN Security 
Council resolutions adopted between 1971 and 1980.43 These resolutions condemn and call 
for the cessation of Israel’s unlawful settlement measures -- in particular the annexation of 
occupied Palestinian land, the forcible transfer of people and the expropriation of Palestinian 
land and properties -- which change the legal, demographic and geographic status of the OPT. 
The Court reaffirmed that these measures violate the peremptory prohibition on the 
acquisition of territory by force,44
                                                        
39 Ibid, para. 86 - 113. The Court affirmed Israel’s obligations under the Hague Convention and Regulations 
(1907), the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. The ICJ did not discuss other human rights treaties Israel is a party to, including the International 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the International Convention against Torture, and the 
International Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 
  which is essential for safeguarding the right to self-
40 The 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties, Article 53. 
41 For a definition of “serious breaches”, see paragraph 14, below. 
42 ILC Article 40, comment 8 and footnote 651. 
43 ICJ 2004 at para. 75, 120, 134 – 135. The Court cites UNSCR 298 (1971), 446 (1979), 452 (1979), 465 (1980) 
and 478 (1980) in this context. 
44 Ibid, para. 74, 87 and 117. The ICJ refers to the UN Charter, Article 2(4), UN Security Council Resolution 242 
(1967) and General Assembly Resolution 2625 of 24 October 1970. 
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determination of the Palestinian people.45 On this basis, the ICJ found that the Wall would 
serve to annex or integrate areas of Israeli settlements into the territory of the State and 
encourage the departure of Palestinian population from certain areas.46 The Court concluded 
that by constructing the Wall, Israel is violating the above peremptory norms, as well as 
additional obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law,47
 
 in 
particular: 
x the prohibition on forced population transfer (Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 
49);48
 
  
x the obligation to respect Palestinian private and public property (Hague Regulations, 
Article 46; Fourth Geneva Convention , Article 53); 
 
x the obligation to refrain from introducing changes in government or institutions of the 
OPT that deprive the Palestinian population of the status and rights enshrined in the 
Fourth Geneva Convention (Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 47);  
 
x the obligations to respect Palestinians’ freedom of movement (ICCPR, Article 12, 
paragraph 1) and to protect from arbitrary and unlawful interference in privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, and from unlawful attacks on honour and reputation 
(ICCPR, Article 17), and, 
 
x the obligation to protect the rights enshrined in the ICESCR and CRC, in particular the 
rights of Palestinians, including children to family, health, education, work and to an 
adequate standard of living.49
 
 
The Court also concluded that Israel’s violation of the right to self-determination of the 
Palestinian people, as well as some of the above violations of international humanitarian law, 
constitute Israeli violations of obligations erga omnes, which are owed by Israel to the entire 
international community and that all States have a legal interest and duty to protect.50
 
  
11. The importance attributed by the ICJ to the peremptory norms and obligations erga 
omnes violated by Israel is illustrated by the manner in which the Court dismissed the 
substantial defenses submitted by the State. Under international law on state responsibility 
(ILC Articles 20 – 26), a State may invoke defenses that preclude the wrongfulness of its 
conduct, including self defense, force majeure, distress and necessity. However, a State 
                                                        
45 Ibid, para. 88. The Court refers to the UN Charter, UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970), and the 
ICESCR, Article 1.  
46 Ibid, para. 119 – 122, 133.  
47 Ibid, para. 123 – 134, 136. 
48 Ibid, para. 126, 133 – 134. The ICJ refers in particular, but not exclusively, to the prohibition of any measures 
taken by an Occupying Power in order to organise or encourage transfer of parts of its own civilian population 
into the occupied territory (Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention).  
49 The ICJ refers in particular to ICCPR Article 17 (1), ICESCR Articles 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14, and CRC 
Articles 16, 24, 27 and 28. 
50 ICJ 2004 at para. 155 - 157. 
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cannot invoke defenses against situations caused partially or entirely by its own conduct, and 
the use of force must in all cases be proportional and in conformity with the UN Charter.  
Moreover, a State may not take recourse to measures that are absolutely prohibited under the 
international obligations of that State. Even treaty provisions cannot preclude the 
wrongfulness of a State’s act that does not conform with an obligation arising under a 
peremptory norm.51
 
  
In the 2004 Advisory Opinion, the ICJ concluded that Israel cannot rely on a right to self-
defence or on a state of necessity in order to preclude the wrongfulness of the construction of 
the Wall, because: 
a) no exceptions are permitted by some of the humanitarian and human rights provisions 
violated by Israel (Hague Regulations, Article 46; Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 47 
and 49(6); ICCPR, Article 17),52
b) the grave infringement on the human rights (civil, political, social, economic and cultural 
rights) of the Palestinian population under Israel’s occupation is not justified by Israel’s 
exigencies of military necessity, national security and public order.
 and, 
53
 
   
12. The ICJ unambiguously referred to Israel’s acts as serious breaches by applying the 
special rules of international law on state responsibility reserved for serious breaches of 
peremptory norms. Under international law in general, States have limited responsibility in 
connection with the wrongful act of another State. States are obliged not to become complicit 
by providing aid or assistance to another State in the commission of a wrongful act (ILC 
Article 16), and a State may have specific treaty obligations to respond to the wrongful act of 
another State. Other than that, no legal responsibility arises for a State in connection with the 
wrongful act of another State, unless the situation is one of serious breaches, in particular 
serious breaches of obligations under a peremptory norm.54
 
 In the special situation that 
arises from a serious breach of a peremptory norm, the responsibility of other States is not 
limited to their treaty obligations, but all States have additional legal obligations, codified in 
ILC Article 41: (1) States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any 
such serious breach; and, (2) No State shall recognise as lawful a situation created by 
such a serious breach, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.  
The ICJ applied ILC Article 41 in its Advisory Opinion of 2004, when it explained that, 
 
“Given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations involved […], 
[i]t is also for all States, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international                                                         
51 See, ILC Article 26, comment 1, explaining that this gives expression to the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
Treaties, Article 53, which provides that a treaty that conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international 
law is void; and to Article 64 providing that an earlier treaty conflicting with a new peremptory norm becomes 
void and terminates. ILC Article 26 also gives expression to the basic principle of "ex injuria non oritur ius" (no 
right can be derived from injustice or from the commission of an unlawful act). 
52 ICJ 2004 at para. 135 - 136. 
53 The ICJ makes explicit reference to Israel’s violation of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; Article 
12(1) of the ICCPR; and Israel’s failure to meet the conditions set out in Article 4 of the ICESCR, i.e., 
restrictions of economic, social and cultural rights must be “solely for the purpose of promoting the general 
welfare in a democratic society.” See, ICJ 2004 at para.136, 137 and 142. 
54 See, ILC Articles, Part One, Chapter IV, comment 9. 
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law, to see to it that any impediment, resulting from the construction of the wall, to the 
exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is brought to an 
end.”55
 
 
and recommended that, 
 
“All States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from 
the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the 
situation created by such construction;  
all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 have in addition the obligation, 
while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure 
compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that 
Convention; 
 
The United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the 
Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the 
illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated regime, 
taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion.”56
 
 
13. To date, no international court has examined or ruled on the responsibility of States, 
Israel and others, in connection with the unlawful Israeli settlement enterprise in its entirety 
and as manifest today. This grand enterprise can be defined, under the approach of the ILC 
Articles, as the entire range and series of Israeli legislative, executive and judiciary acts and 
omissions committed since 1967 by government, parliament, courts, the military, central and 
local authorities and other public and private entities and persons, which are attributable to the 
State of Israel as explained in paragraphs 3 – 6, and have contributed to and resulted in: 
  
(i) extensive unlawful expropriation of private and public Palestinian property 
affecting approximately one third of the entire public and private Palestinian land in the 
occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, as well as its water and other natural 
resources;57 and in the annexation, de jure or de facto, and permanent integration of large 
areas of the occupied West Bank (approximately 50 per cent) into the State of Israel. The 
latter has been achieved mainly through the allocation of Palestinian land confiscated or 
slated for confiscation to the regional and local councils/municipalities of the approximately 
200 Israeli settlements and associated infrastructure, including the Wall, roads, other transport 
infrastructure and industrial zones;58                                                        
55 ICJ 2004 at para. 159. See also, para. 138 and 161. 
  
56 Ibid; decision at para. 163. 
57 B’tselem, By Hook and By Crook, 2011, p. 24, 30. In East Jerusalem, approximately one third of the land has 
been confiscated. In the rest of the West Bank, most of the confiscated land (26.7 per cent) has been expropriated 
through spurious declarations of “state land.” See also: Amnesty International, Troubled Waters – Palestinians 
Denied Fair Access to Water, 2009. 58 Ibid, p. 21, 28. Land allocated directly to the settlements amounts to approximately 43per cent of the West 
Bank. Land slated for confiscation is so-called “survey land” comprising 12 per cent of the West Bank. On maps 
of Israeli authorities, it is already marked as land over which the Custodian “claims ownership,” which is the 
¿UVWVWDJHLQGHFODULQJSURSHUW\WREH³VWDWHODQG´For a current map of the West Bank illustrating the scope of 
annexation/integration of territory into Israel, see: 
http://www.btselem.org/download/20110612_btselem_map_of_wb_eng.pdf. For a map showing the municipal 
area of each settlement, including the portion of private Palestinian land in it, see: http://peacenow.org/map.php. 
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(ii) large-scale forced population transfer, including: the transfer of more than 
500,000 Jewish settlers into the OPT, mainly by means of a regulatory regime, including 
economic incentives and public and private services, that sustains and encourages growth of 
the settlements; and the forcible transfer of the Palestinian population within and outside 
the OPT.59 This has been accomplished mainly by means of the Wall and a system of 
property and residency laws and permits, which severely restrict Palestinian freedom of 
movement, give rise to forced evictions and widespread destruction of Palestinian homes and 
commercial property, isolate occupied East Jerusalem, and confine the population in the so-
called Areas A and B which comprise approximately 40 per cent of the West Bank. No 
comprehensive and authoritative information is available about the total number of 
Palestinians forcibly displaced since 1967. In the Jordan Valley, for example, Israeli policies 
have decimated the number of Palestinian inhabitants from 320,000 in 1967 to 65,000 
today.60
 
 Another large group of victims are the approximately one million Palestinian 
refugees originating from the OPT (“1967 refugees”), whose legal status in the OPT has been 
revoked and whose right to return has been denied by Israel, in order to create demographic 
change and enable expropriation and annexation of Palestinian land;  
(iii) unlawful infringement of the entire set of human rights of the occupied 
Palestinian population by the above policies, which have forced Palestinians to resort to 
livelihoods of subsistence, and by policies and practices undermining Palestinians’ right to 
life, liberty and security.61 The latter include measures of “security and public order” applied 
in a sweeping, deliberate and arbitrary manner -- often in the form of collective punishment -- 
against Palestinian communities, groups and individuals, in particular those opposing the 
above Israeli policies and practices. Thus, for example, since 1967, almost 40 per cent of the 
male Palestinian population in the OPT has experienced detention, including arbitrary 
“administrative detention” without charge or trial, by Israeli authorities.62 No comprehensive 
and authoritative record exists of the Palestinian casualties inflicted by Israeli violence, 
including torture and extra-judicial executions in the OPT since 1967. It is estimated that 
between 2000 and 2007 alone, 3,800 Palestinians, most of them civilians, were killed and 
approximately 27,000 injured during Israeli military operations, border incidents, search and 
arrest operations and undercover operations;63                                                                                                                                                                             
See also, OCHA-OPT, “Fact Sheet: The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlement Policies”, January 2012, at: 
 and, 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_settlements_FactSheet_January_2012_english.pdf 
59 Regarding the circumstances and scope of the ongoing forcible transfer of Palestinians, see: Diakonia, IHL 
Program, at: http://www.diakonia.se/IHL_english; ICAHD, The Judaization of Palestine: 2011 Displacement 
Trends (2012); and, Badil, Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2009 – 2010 
(2010).   
60 ICAHD, The Judaization of Palestine (supra, note 59). 
61 Approximately 40 per cent of the affected Palestinian population in the OPT are refugees since 1948, who 
originate from locations inside Israel. Although their forced exile in the OPT is not directly related to Israel’s 
settlement enterprise in the OPT and pre-dates it, they are victims of a similar Israeli policy of forced population 
transfer implemented since 1948 in order to expropriate Palestinian land and change the demographic 
composition of  the territory of the State of  Israel.  
62 See, Addameer, “Background on Israeli Detention”, at: http://www.addameer.org/etemplate.php?id=290. See 
also, DCI-Palestine Section: www.dci-Palestine.org   
63 Based on OCHA-OPT, “Special Focus: Israeli-Palestinian Fatalities Since 2000 - Key Trends”, August 2007. 
See also, MDD reports of al Haq, in particular, MDD Report July – December 2011; and, 
http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/topics/right-to-life-and-body-integrity 
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(iv) establishment of a discriminatory legislative and regulatory regime in the OPT 
that privileges Israel’s settlers, while depriving the occupied Palestinian population of 
the rights enshrined in the Fourth Geneva Convention and relevant human rights 
treaties, and enabling the implementation of the above polices by Israel, the Occupying 
Power. Israel’s systematic racial discrimination and policies of segregation and apartheid 
have been noted with concern by local and international human rights organisations, UN 
Special Rapporteurs on the Situation of Human Rights in the OPT, and the UN Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD).64
 
 Their findings refer to racial 
discrimination in all spheres of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. This 
discrimination, in the course of more than four decades, has been institutionalised in two 
separate and parallel legal regimes in the OPT: one based on Israeli civil law for the 
privileged settlers, the other a military regime applied to the occupied Palestinian population. 
14. In the absence of an authoritative legal opinion on State responsibility in connection 
with Israel’s entire settlement enterprise as currently manifest, a tentative projection of 
the main findings can be undertaken based on the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004. The 
ICJ’s analysis as applied to the entire settlement enterprise, rather than only to the 
construction of the Wall and its associated regime, confirms the Israeli breaches already 
identified in connection with the Wall (see paragraph 10); it also reveals Israeli breaches of 
a much larger scope and highlights their serious character. It shows, for example, that by 
imposing the dramatic changes of the status and demographic composition of the OPT and the 
related infringement on the human rights of the occupied Palestinian population described in 
paragraph 13, Israel is committing not only the breaches already identified in the 2004 ICJ 
Advisory Opinion. The ICJ’s analysis as applied to the entire settlement enterprise reveals 
additional Israeli breaches of peremptory norms of customary international law, in particular 
the prohibitions on colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid, and it exposes the 
gross and systematic manner in which Israel has violated these norms in order to affect the 
dramatic changes of the status and demographic composition of the OPT.65
 
  
Serious breaches of peremptory norms are defined as the gross or systematic failure by the 
responsible State to fulfil its obligations under these norms (ILC Article 40).66                                                        
64 For relevant reports of the Special Rapporteurs on the Situation of Human Rights in the OPT since 1967, see, 
in particular, SR John Dugard, A/HRC/4/17 (29 Jan 2007); SR Richard Falk, A/HRC/16/72 (10 January 2011). 
For CERD Concluding Observations on Israel, see, CERD/C/ISR/CO/13 (14 June 2007) and 
CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16 (9 March 2012). See also, Human Rights Watch, Separate and Unequal. Israel’s 
Discriminatory Treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories; B’Tselem, 
 Israel’s failure 
Checkpoints, 
Physical Obstructions, and Forbidden Roads; and, Al-Haq’s interactive map on Israel’s discriminatory water 
policies, at: 
http://alhaq.mits.ps/index.php/interactive-map/interactive-map-water 
65 For a ground-breaking legal analysis of Israeli violations under these peremptory norms, as well as the 
collective (erga omnes) character of these breaches, see, Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid?, South African 
Human Sciences Research Council, May 2009. 
66 ILC Article 40, comment 8: to be regarded as “systematic,” a violation has to be carried out in an organised 
and deliberate way. The term “gross” refers to the intensity of the violation or its effects; it denotes violations of 
a flagrant nature, amounting to a direct and outright assault on the values protected by the rule. Factors that  may 
establish the seriousness of a violation would include the intent to violate the norm, the scope and number of 
individual violations, and the gravity of their consequences for the victims. Examples of such serious breaches 
are provided in ILC Article 41, comments 7 and 8. These include, among others, the Portuguese colonial rule, 
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to respect its obligations under peremptory norms is gross and systematic. The illegal 
settlement enterprise has been pursued as a matter of declared State policy, with the aim and 
intent to change the status and demographic composition of the OPT. For this purpose, the 
Israeli State, including governments and the official organs and empowered entities 
mentioned earlier, has since the beginning of the occupation in 1967 planned, approved, 
legislated, financed and executed the appropriation and annexation de jure and de facto of 
Palestinian land; the construction of Israeli settlement infrastructure; the transfer of Israeli 
settlers into the OPT; and the forcible  transfer,  restriction of development and growth of the 
Palestinian population.67 The gross and flagrant nature of these breaches is evident in their 
grave consequences for the Palestinian victims and in the fact that Israel has ignored repeated 
condemnation and calls by the international community, including numerous resolutions of 
the UN Security Council,68 to rescind its unlawful measures. Serious breaches of peremptory 
norms under specific circumstances can amount to international crimes, and they are likely to 
be composite breaches (ILC Article 15). Some of most serious wrongful acts in international 
law, such as systematic racial discrimination and apartheid, are composite breaches. These are 
defined as a series of acts, where not only each single act may be wrongful, but which are 
wrongful in aggregate. They are continuing breaches, with responsibility extending from the 
first of the act or omissions in the series.69
 
 
15. Israel does not have valid defences precluding the wrongfulness of its settlement 
enterprise, for the reasons explained in the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004 (see paragraph 11), 
and because nothing can justify the discriminatory nature of Israel’s settlement 
enterprise, even if it were established that the obligations of the occupant under humanitarian 
law change with the passage of time.70
                                                                                                                                                                             
denial of self-determination in Rhodesia, Namibia and East Timor, apartheid in South Africa, the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait, and the situation created by the former Republic of Yugoslavia through population transfer in Bosnia 
and Kosovo. 
 Israel’s construction of permanent infrastructure 
in the OPT, the extension of Israeli law to the OPT, and the extraction of natural 
resources and exploitation of the economy of the OPT in a manner that discriminates 
67 See, Section I, in particular paragraphs 3-5, above. 
68 ICJ 2004 at para. 75, 120, 134 – 135. UNSC Resolution 446 (1979), for example, calls upon Israel, "to rescind 
its previous measures and to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status and 
geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 
1967, including Jerusalem and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied 
Arab territories."  The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004 cites UNSCR 237 (1967), 242 (1967), 267 (1969), 271 
(1969), 298 (1971), 338 (1973), 446 (1979), 452 (1979), 465 (1980), 476 (1980), 478 (1980), 681 (1990), 799 
(1992), 904 (1994), 1073 (1996), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003). 
69 See, ILC Article 15, comments 1 and 2; and, ILC Article 14 explaining the meaning and responsibility 
resulting from a continuing breach. See also, Cherif Bassiouni, “International Crimes: “Jus Cogens” and 
Obligations Erga Omnes”, in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 59, No. 4. 
70 The question if and how prolonged occupation changes the nature of the obligations of the Occupying Power 
under humanitarian law is a matter of legal debate and controversy. Some scholars and the Israeli High Court 
have argued that increased Israeli economic engagement in and development of the OPT conforms with Israel’s 
IHL obligations and is necessary in order to provide for the needs of the occupied Palestinian population, while 
others have rejected this argument. In any case, the legal debate about the impact of the prolonged occupation on 
Israel’s IHL obligations in the OPT is different from and of limited relevance to the analysis of state 
responsibility in connection with the settlement enterprise, which is clearly discriminatory and illegal under 
international law. See, A.J.I.L., Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion; and, S. Akram and M. Lynk, The Wall and the 
Law (supra, note 7). See also, Susan Akram and Michael Lynk, “Arab-Israeli Conflict” in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2012).  
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against the occupied Palestinian population and benefits Israel’s own population and 
economy inside Israeli territory and in the OPT cannot be justified under international 
law. Israel’s responsibility is, therefore, engaged, and, as in the case of the Wall, the serious 
breaches of peremptory norms and obligations erga omnes resulting from Israel’s settlement 
enterprise in the OPT trigger the heightened responsibility of all States under customary 
international law (see paragraph 12). 
 
16. In conclusion, Israel, with its settlement enterprise in the OPT as defined in paragraph 13, 
is in breach of its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and human rights treaties. 
Forcible population transfer, torture and the unlawful destruction or confiscation of property 
during an armed conflict constitute war crimes, which give rise to individual responsibility.71  
Under customary international law, the State of Israel is responsible for acts and 
omissions, which, separately and in aggregate, violate, in a gross and systematic manner, 
the prohibitions on racial discrimination, apartheid, the acquisition of territory by force 
and colonial domination. All of these constitute serious breaches of peremptory norms that 
are essential for safeguarding Palestinians as human beings and their right to self-
determination as a people, and they are violations of obligations erga omnes, which are of 
concern to the international community as a whole (see also paragraph 9). This, as well as the 
composite character of Israel’s serious breaches, is recognised by independent experts who 
have characterised Israel’s regime of occupation, including the settlements in the OPT, as “a 
regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid” and 
recommended for States and the United Nations to request a second ICJ advisory opinion 
about the legal consequences of such unlawful regime.72
 
 
 
III. The legal consequences for Israel, the responsible State 
 
17. Under international law on state responsibility as applied by the 2004 ICJ Advisory 
Opinion, the following legal consequences arise for the State of Israel from its illegal 
settlement enterprise in the OPT: 
a) to perform the obligations breached (ILC Article 29); 
b) to cease all settlement activity in the OPT, and to offer appropriate assurances and 
guarantees of non-repetition (ILC Article 30). This includes the obligations to 
dismantle the settlements, the Wall and related infrastructure in the OPT, ensure the                                                         
71 See, al Haq, “Q&A on Corporate Accountability for International Law Violations”, at: 
http://www.alhaq.org/images/stories/PDF/qa-corporate-accountability.pdf.  See also, Badil, Applying 
International Criminal Law to Israel’s Treatment of the Palestinian People, Working Paper 12 (2011);  
International Commission of Jurists, Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability, 2008, Vol. I, II.; Yasmine 
Gado, Principles and Mechanisms to Hold Business Accountable for Human Rights Abuses: Potential Avenues 
to Challenge Corporate Involvement in Israel’s Oppression of the Palestinian People, Badil, 2009; and, Liesbeth 
Zegveld and Jeff Handmaker, “Universal Jurisdiction: State of Affairs and Ways Ahead”, ISS Working Paper 
no. 532, International Institute of Social Sciences, The Hague, January 2012. Note: The Rome Statute of the ICC 
also defines some of these war crimes, including apartheid, as well as “persecution”, as crimes against humanity. 
Further analysis is required to determine the meaning and implications of these in the context of Israel and the 
Palestinian people.   
72 See, former Special Rapporteur on the OPT John Dugard, A/HRC/4/17; and, Special Rapporteur on the OPT 
Richard Falk, A/HRC/16/72 (supra, note 64). See also, findings of the Russell Tribunal on Palestine, Third 
Session, South Africa, November 2011 (on the RToP website). 
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departure of the settlers from this area, and to repeal or render ineffective all related 
legislative and regulatory acts; 
c) to make full reparation for all damage caused by the illegal settlement enterprise, 
whether moral or material, through restitution, compensation and satisfaction (ILC 
Articles 31 – 39). This includes the obligations to: return the land and other 
immovable property seized from any natural or legal person for the settlement 
enterprise in the OPT; facilitate the return of all persons displaced in this context, and, 
undertake legislative reform as required for this purpose. Where restitution is 
impossible, Israel has an obligation to compensate the victims for the damage 
suffered. Israel also has an obligation to compensate, in accordance with the 
applicable rules of international law, all natural or legal persons having suffered any 
form of material damage as a result of  its settlement enterprise in the OPT.73
 
 
18. Israel may not take recourse to its domestic law in order to justify its failure to comply 
with these obligations (ILC Article 32). Restitution, i.e., to re-establish the situation that 
existed before the wrongful act was committed, is the primary form of reparation required 
under international law from Israel, the responsible State, to the extent that this: (i) is not 
materially impossible, and (ii) does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit 
deriving from restitution instead of compensation (ILC Article 35). Determination of what is 
materially possible or proportional may require third party arbitration. In any case, restitution 
by Israel is of particular importance, because its breaches are of a continuing and 
serious character and violate peremptory norms and obligations erga omnes under 
customary international law. It is recognised, for example, that in the case of unlawful 
annexation, restitution (or cessation) includes the withdrawal of the occupying State’s forces, 
the annulment of any decree of annexation, and ancillary measures, such as the return of 
persons or property seized in the course of the invasion.74
 
  
 
IV. The Legal Consequences for Other States 
  
19. This section discusses the responsibility of other States in connection with Israel’s 
serious breaches of peremptory norms under customary international law. It focuses on the 
content of the legal obligations arising for other States from Israel’s breaches committed 
through its settlement enterprise in the OPT, and on the mechanisms available for States to 
perform their obligations. 
 
20. Customary international law on state responsibility is complementary to and does 
not replace the specific obligations of States arising from treaties. With regard to treaty 
obligations, the ICJ has already confirmed that States parties to the Fourth Geneva                                                         
73 The ICJ Advisory Opinion affirms Israel’s obligations of cessation and full reparation. See, ICJ 2004, para. 
151 – 153 and 163. In response, the UN General Assembly established a UN Register of Damages (UNRoD), 
which registers material damage caused to Palestinians by the Wall but does not have the mandate or 
mechanisms required for processing claims, or for ensuring that Israel provides restitution and compensation to 
the Palestinian victims.(See also paragraph 27.) 
74 ILC Article 35, comment 6. 
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Convention are responsible to ensure Israel’s respect of the provisions of the Convention (see 
paragraph 12). States also have obligations under other treaties they have ratified, such as the 
International Convention against Torture, the International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). State signatories to any of the above treaties, for example, have the obligation to 
ensure that persons responsible for serious breaches amounting to international crimes are 
brought to justice.75
 
   
21. As explained in paragraph 12, the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004 confirmed that serious 
breaches of peremptory norms and obligations erga omnes, such as those committed by Israel 
with its settlement enterprise in the OPT, give rise to legal consequences for all States beyond 
what is required by the relevant treaties. Because Israel breaches norms and obligations which 
are universally binding and of concern to the international community as a whole, all States 
have the additional legal obligations laid out in ILC Article 41, i.e., (1) to cooperate to 
bring to an end Israel’s serious breaches, and (2) not to recognise as lawful the illegal 
situation created by Israel, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. This 
means that every State has not only a duty to abstain, but also a positive duty to act as 
required in order to perform these obligations.76
 
 
22. As for the obligations arising for all States under ILC Article 41, paragraph 2, the 
obligation not to recognise as lawful the illegal situation created by Israel refers both to 
formal recognition and also prohibits acts which would imply such recognition.77
                                                        
75 See, for example, Badil: Applying International Criminal Law, p. 59 – 61 (supra, note 71). 
 The 
obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation is, again, a special 
obligation which arises because of the continuing and composite character of Israel’s 
serious breaches, as explained in paragraph 15. Under normal circumstances, aid or 
assistance is wrongful only if a State: (i) aids or assists another State in the actual commission 
of a wrongful act, (ii) does so with the knowledge of the wrongful act, and (iii), that act would 
also be unlawful if committed by the aiding/assisting State (ILC Article 16).  In the special 
circumstances of serious breaches of peremptory norms, such as those committed by Israel, 
the obligation not to render aid or assistance is broader. Due the composite character of these 
breaches explained in paragraph 14, this obligation extends beyond aid and assistance in the 
commission of the serious breach itself to the maintenance of the situation created by the 
breach. Moreover, States cannot invoke defences against the wrongfulness of aid or assistance 
by arguing that they were not aware of the situation.  Proof of knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act is not required, “as it is hardly 
76 Although some legal scholars and States contest that cooperation constitutes a positive obligation for all and 
each State to act, this obligation was affirmed by the majority of the judges in the 2004 ICJ Advisory opinion 
(see paragraph 12 above). Others have argued that even if there is an obligation to cooperate, it is practically 
meaningless, because the law does not specify what States should do; participation in the Quartet, or in 
discussions at the UN, could be enough to meet this obligation. The ILC Articles, however, clearly qualify that 
appropriate forms of cooperation are to “counteract the effect of Israel’s serious breaches.” See, Article 41, 
comment 1 and 2. The element of positive action in the obligation to not render aid or assistance is affirmed in 
ILC Article 41, para. 12. 
77 ILC Article 41, comment 5. 
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conceivable that a State would not have notice of the commission of a serious breach by 
another State.”78
 
  
Implicit in the above is the obligation of all States to ensure that its organs, as well as 
public and private entities and persons whose activities are attributable to the State 
under international law, do not violate these obligations. This may include, for example, 
persons authorised or instructed to conduct official relations with the State of Israel or Israeli 
public or private entities. It also includes State-funded or otherwise-supported aid agencies 
and business enterprises operating in Israel or in the OPT and performing certain official 
functions.79
 
  
23. The obligation of all States to cooperate to bring to an end Israel’s serious breaches 
(ILC Article 41, paragraph 1) applies to States whether or not they are individually affected, 
and it means that States are under a positive obligation to undertake a joint and coordinated 
effort to counteract the effect of these breaches.80 Customary international law on state 
responsibility as codified in the ILC Articles does not prescribe in detail in what form States 
must cooperate in order to perform this obligation. Cooperation may be in the framework of 
competent international organizations working together, such as the United Nations, and it 
may take the form of non-institutionalized cooperation. As for measures, States could, for 
example, request a second ICJ advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s 
settlement enterprise,  or act to persuade the Security Council to take enforcement action 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, for example under “The Responsibility to Protect” 
Resolution.81
 
 Finally, States can take “countermeasures,” i.e., various forms of sanctions, 
which can be implemented within and outside the UN system (see below). 
24. Implementation of state responsibility begins with a formal notice of claim which may, 
for example, be presented to the responsible State, or through the commencement of 
proceedings before an international court or tribunal (ILC Article 43). Usually, the right to 
present a claim and to adopt lawful measures against the wrongful act of a State is reserved to 
the injured State (ILC Article 42). However, in situations of a serious breach of a peremptory 
norm, all States are presumed injured or affected and, therefore, entitled to claim cessation of 
the breach, as well as reparation for the injured State and/or the victims (Article 48) .82
                                                        
78 ILC Article 41, comment 11.  
 All 
States are, thus, entitled to claim from Israel cessation of its illegal settlement enterprise, 
79 See, ILC Articles, Part One, Chapter II, for conduct attributable to the State.  This is affirmed, inter alia, in the 
UN Guidelines on Business and Human Rights, Section I, “The State Duty to Protect Human Rights.” See,  
www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pdf 
80 ILC Article 41, comment 2 and 3.  
81 States can also take measures under the special law regulating diplomatic relations, or the special rules of 
international organisations, such as UN rules. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a UN resolution recognising 
that the international community has to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. Under R2P, the UN can intervene with diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means, and also through enforcement, including armed intervention, under Chapter VII, preferably in 
cooperation with regional organisations. See, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, UNSC Resolution 1674 
(2006), and the report of the UN Secretary General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (2009). 
82 Claims for reparation by a State other than the injured State must be made on behalf of the injured State or the 
victims. See, ILC Article 48, 2(b) and comment 12. 
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and reparation for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian 
victims.  
 
When a State responsible for a serious breach of a peremptory norm does not comply with 
the obligation of cessation and reparation, all other States may adopt "countermeasures”, 
i.e., sanctions or reprisals (ILC Article 54).83 Countermeasures are defined as measures of a 
State that would be unlawful unless taken in response to an internationally wrongful act 
in order to procure cessation and reparation from the responsible State (ILC Article 49). 
Countermeasures must comply with the rules for threat or use of force as embodied in the UN 
Charter and respect fundamental human rights, humanitarian obligations and peremptory 
norms (ILC Article 50), and they must be proportional  (ILC Article 51). When States, other 
than injured States, take countermeasures, they often do so in the framework of international 
organisations, such as under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, a 
State, or a group of States, may also take individual countermeasures. In light of Israel’s 
persistent and flagrant non-compliance with the relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions and the law expounded in the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004, all States are, 
thus, in the terms of ILC Article 54, entitled to take countermeasures in order to bring 
about cessation of its breaches and reparation.84 In light of existing State practice, it would 
be lawful, for example, for States to adopt domestic legislation prohibiting import of Israeli 
goods, or export to Israel; suspend, with immediate effect, cooperation agreements with 
Israel; impose other forms of embargoes on trade and cooperation; freeze funds and assets of 
the Israeli State, entities and persons responsible for the serious breaches; bar Israeli banks 
from international financial transfers (SWIFT); and suspend agreements on landing rights of 
airplanes or impose flight bans. Moreover, States have also suspended agreements because of 
“a fundamental change of circumstances,” rather than the right to take countermeasures. 
States could suspend bilateral treaties with Israel also on this basis; EU members could 
explore ways to replicate the measures adopted in 1991, when European Community 
members suspended and later denounced the 1983 Cooperation Agreement with 
Yugoslavia.85
 
 
25. Failure by other States to perform their legal obligations as codified in 
ILC Article 41, i.e., violation of treaty obligations, failure to cooperate to end the serious 
breaches committed by the responsible State or the provision of unlawful aid or assistance to 
the former, gives rise to various forms of complicity.86
                                                        
83 Countermeasures have been taken by injured States and otherwise affected States (ILC Article 48). Whereas 
the entitlement of injured States to take countermeasures is well established in international law, the legal 
entitlement of other States to do so is subject to the progressive development of the law. See, ILC Article 54, 
comment 1, 6 and 7.  
 Other States become themselves 
responsible for wrongful conduct (ILC Article 1) and incur the additional legal 
84 In light of the language in para.159 of the ICJ Advisory Opinion, whether there is an obligation upon States to 
take such countermeasures is controversial but they are certainly entitled to take such measures in order to end 
Israel’s serious breaches, in particular those caused by the Wall and settlements. In para.159, the Court explains 
that, “it is ... for all States to see to it that any impediment, resulting from the construction of the wall, to the 
exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is brought to an end.”   
85 The examples in this paragraph are based on the illustrative examples of State practice provided in ILC Article 
54, comment 3 and 4. 
86 See, for example, Aust, Helmut Philipp, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility, 2011.  
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obligations of cessation and reparation (ILC Articles 28 – 31). Under customary 
international law, this usually results in limited legal responsibility.87 However, assistance 
given by one State to another after the latter has committed an internationally wrongful act 
may, in some circumstances, amount to the adoption of that act, and result in full legal 
responsibility of the assisting State for the breach pursuant to ILC Article 11.88
 
 
V. Concluding Observations on State Practice in Response to Israel’s 
Illegal Settlement Enterprise 
26. In practice, many States have invested in the peace process and in aid to the Palestinian 
people.  However, cooperation of States for these purposes has been guided by the terms of 
the Oslo Accords, which protect Israeli interests and sideline international law. Consequently, 
States have not performed their legal obligations vis-a-vis the situation of serious 
breaches of peremptory norms of customary international law that has been created by 
Israel with its settlement enterprise in the OPT(see paragraph 16).89
 
    
27. With regard to the legal obligations as codified in ILC Article 41, States have failed to 
effectively uphold both their obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and other 
relevant treaties (see paragraph 20) and those arising under customary international law in 
two main respects: 
 
First, many States are complicit through the provision of unlawful recognition, and aid 
or assistance in both the actual commission of Israel’s serious breaches and in the 
maintenance of the unlawful situation thereby created, and all States have failed to ensure 
that no form of such recognition, aid or assistance is provided by the organs, entities and 
individuals whose activities are attributable to the State. States thereby violate the 
obligations described in paragraph 22.  
 
Especially grave examples of unlawful aid and assistance in the commission of Israel’s 
breaches are military aid or cooperation with Israel’s oppression of Palestinians in the OPT.90
                                                        
87 The responsibility of other States is not to be confused with the responsibility of the acting State. Other States 
are only responsible to the extent that their own conduct has caused or contributed to the breach committed by 
the acting State. See, for example: ILC Article 16, comments 1 and 10. 
 
Other examples are official aid or other forms of support for the construction and 
88 ILC Articles, Part One, Chapter IV, comment 9. 
89 For a critical analysis of international development aid in the OPT based on a similar assessment, see, Anne 
Le More, International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo: Political Guilt, Wasted Money, Routledge, 
2008. 
90 For legal analysis and examples of current agreements and projects of military cooperation with Israel, see, 
“Comprehensive Military Embargo of Israel”, BNC Working Paper, 9 July 2011, at: 
http://www.bdsmovement.net/2011/military-embargo-working-paper-7517#.Ty_YscVQiSo 
As for U.S. military aid, Israel will have received up to USD 3.1 billion annually in the period of 2009 – 2018. 
Until 2008, Israel had received a mix of military and civilian aid amounting to USD 3 – 4.3 billion. This does 
not include loan guarantees and special aid packages and other forms of non-financial military assistance, and 
approximately USD 2 billion annually in donations, as direct payments and via purchase of Israel Bonds, from 
private U.S. entities and person. See, US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation, Policy Paper “US Military 
Aid to Israel” (2012), at: http://aidtoisrael.org/section.php?id=400. See also, John Mersheimer and Stephen Walt, 
The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, New York: Farrar, Straus, Gioroux, 2007; p. 24 -31. 
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development of Israel’s Wall, checkpoints, terminals, prisons and detention centres,91 and for 
so-called joint Israeli-Palestinian industrial zones in the OPT, which benefit Israeli business, 
undermine Palestinian development and exploit Palestinian labour.92
 
 Assistance in the 
commission of Israel’s breaches is also provided where direct, often tax-exempt, support of 
the illegal settlements by (Jewish and Christian) Zionist organisations is permitted by the 
State in which they are registered. A grave act of complicity, which may amount to outright 
endorsement and adoption of Israel’s serious breaches (paragraph 25), is the international 
protection provided to Israel by the U.S., mainly through diplomatic pressure on other States, 
in the full knowledge of the circumstances, thereby systematically obstructing efforts of all 
States to cooperate within and outside the United Nations and to counteract Israel’s serious 
breaches.  
Furthermore, the legal obligation not to provide aid or assistance in maintaining the unlawful 
situation is violated where States, directly or based on bilateral or multilateral agreements 
with the State of Israel, cooperate with or support the settlement activities of Israeli state-
organs or public and private entities, such as those mentioned in Section I, or where due 
diligence is excluded. Examples include numerous cases of cooperation in trade and research, 
including by the EU93, as well as the large amount of un-earmarked U.S. financial aid 
provided to Israel for civilian purposes at least until 2008.94  Aid or assistance is also 
provided where donor governments and state-funded aid agencies construct Palestinian 
infrastructure, in particular roads, which indirectly contributes to the maintenance of Israel’s 
regime of segregation and apartheid in the OPT and/or the expansion and entrenchment of 
Israel’s settlements in the OPT,95 or procure materials or goods for humanitarian and 
development aid from Israeli suppliers implicated in the settlement enterprise. Finally, this 
legal obligation is also violated when States finance or otherwise support activities or projects 
of (transnational) business companies which contribute to Israel’s unlawful settlement 
enterprise in the OPT.96
 
  
All such aid or assistance also amounts to recognition of the illegal situation created by Israel 
in the OPT. Particularly grave violations of the obligation not to recognise this unlawful 
situation include, for example, the 2004 letter of assurances of U.S. President Bush to Israeli 
Prime Minister Sharon, which endorsed Israel’s unlawful acquisition of occupied territory and                                                         
91 See, for example, CNI, “More on US Aid for Checkpoint Crossings”, Electronic Intifada, 11 February 2005. 
92 See, for example, Sam Bahour, “Economic Prison Zones”, Maan News Agency, 20 November 2010; and, 
Bisan, “Palestinian Development Between Sovereignty and Dependency: the Industrial Zones Model” 
(Workshop Report), at:  http://en.bisan.org/content/palestinian-development-between-sovereignty-and-
dependency-industrial-zones-model. 
93 For relevant findings on the EU Trade Association Agreement with Israel, see, for example, Russell Tribunal 
on Palestine, Barcelona Session, March 2010, p.16-17 (on the RToP website). The Tribunal further noted that 
the silence of the European Union and its member states on Israel’s international law violations can be 
interpreted as tacit approval or acceptance (p. 21). 
94 Direct U.S. aid for civilian purposes was discontinued in 2009. See, US Campaign to End the Israeli 
Occupation, Policy Paper (supra, note 90).  
95 See, for example, Nadia Hijab and Jesse Rosenfeld, “Palestinian Roads: Cementing Statehood, or Israeli 
Annexation?” The Nation, 30 April 2010.  
96 (Transnational) companies which implement such projects and activities in the OPT include, among others, 
G4S, HP, Motorola, Veolia, Alstom, Caterpillar, Volvo and Hyundai. See, www.whoprofits.org, and the 
websites of Al Haq, the Civic Coalition for Defending Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem (CCDPRJ), and Diakonia. 
See also, www.electronicintifada.net; and www.business-humanrights.org   
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has since contributed to increasing international recognition of Israel’s illegal “settlement 
blocks.”97 Another grave example is the decision of the OECD in 2010 to accept Israel, with 
its settlements in the OPT but without the occupied Palestinian population, as a member in 
that organisation.98
 
 Recognition is also provided when States or State-funded aid agencies 
abide by Israel’s illegal permit regime in the OPT, or when State representatives conduct 
relations with Israeli organs or entities endorsing the illegal settlement enterprise. Recognition 
is, moreover, implied when States and State-funded agencies fail to hold Israel accountable 
for its serious breaches in public statements or UN resolutions, or tolerate destruction or 
damage of aid-infrastructure or aid-equipment by the Israeli army without military necessity, 
or by private settlers. 
Second, all States have failed to perform the obligation to cooperate and act as required 
for ending Israel’s serious breaches (see paragraph 23). Many States, in particular the U.S. 
and members of the EU, have undermined effective cooperation in the United Nations, for 
example by opposing or vetoing relevant UN resolutions, under the pretext that this is 
required for “preserving the peace process.”99 The UN General Assembly and its member 
States have not acted upon the recommendations of the 2004 ICJ Advisory Opinion. States, 
acting individually or collectively, have not presented a formal claim to Israel for 
cessation of the serious breaches and reparation for the Palestinian victims in the terms 
of ILC Article 48 (see paragraph 24). To the contrary, State sponsors of the peace process 
have withheld support from the PLO when it presented such claims in the negotiations with 
Israel. Governments of many States have also employed political pressure that has obstructed 
efforts by civil society to prosecute alleged Israeli war criminals and to affirm the obligations 
of States in international or domestic courts.100
 
  
28. Moreover, no State, or group of States, has adopted appropriate countermeasures 
                                                        
97 Letter of 14 April 2004 from President Bush to Prime Minister Sharon as published on the Knesset’s website: 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/DisengageSharon_letters_eng.htm. See also, Al-Haq, Exploring the 
Illegality of ‘Land Swap’ Agreements under Occupation, 2011, at: 
http://www.alhaq.org/publications/publications-index/item/exploring-the-illegality-of-land-swap-agreements-
under-occupation 
98 See, for example: http://electronicintifada.net/content/palestinian-civil-society-slams-oecd-over-israels-
accession/1054 
99 Despite the unprecedented expansion of Israeli settlements since the 1990s, the UN Security Council has not 
adopted new resolutions of the kind it had adopted previously (see paragraph 10, note 41, and note 66). The UN 
Security Council has, moreover, not taken action against Israel’s illegal Wall; a UN Security Council draft 
resolution (S/2003/980 of 14 October 2003), for example, was vetoed. (Source: UNISPAL) 100 For a review of cases brought, see, Badil,  al-Majdal Magazine, “Litigating Palestine” (Spring-Summer 
2009). Cases include the case of Al-Haq submitted to the High Court of England and Wales. In this case, Al-Haq 
argued that the UK had certain legal obligations under customary international law arising from Israel’s 
violations of various peremptory norms, including the right to self-determination and the prohibition against 
acquisition of territory by force, and that the UK had failed to meet its obligations. Al-Haq argued that the Court 
had the competence to review the government’s failure and to order the government to, inter alia, suspend all 
UK government financial or ministerial assistance to UK companies exporting military technology or goods to 
Israel, request that the EU suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement, and call a conference of the signatory 
State to the Fourth Geneva Convention to address Israel’s grave breaches of the Convention. Both, the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal rejected the claims and ruled that the matter was non-justiciable (The High Court 
of Justice, Divisional Court, Case no: C0/1739/2009, decision of 27 July 2009; at appeal: The Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales, decision of 25 February 2010. See also, al Haq press release, 8 March 2010.  
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(sanctions) in the terms of customary international law on state responsibility as codified 
in ILC Articles 54 (see paragraph 24). Some States, members of the Arab League, maintain 
an official policy of non-cooperation (anti-normalisation, boycott) with Israel, but do not 
implement it. Others, for example Turkey and some States of Central and South America, 
have implemented certain limited or short-termed diplomatic measures or forms of sanctions 
in response to especially brutal and unlawful incidents. Israel’s military operation against the 
occupied Gaza Strip in the winter of 2008/9 and its military attack against the Turkish civil 
society-led humanitarian flotilla to the Gaza Strip in the spring of 2010 resulted in a short-
lived suspension of Turkish flights to Israel and a flight ban on Israeli military planes in 
Turkish airspace. The EU has for a long time been trying, without much success, to exclude 
goods from the illegal Israeli settlements in the OPT from the benefits of its Trade 
Association Agreement with Israel by imposing customs duties on them.101 However, such 
limited measures do not meet the standards of effective countermeasures against Israel’s 
illegal settlement enterprise because they do not address the serious breaches of peremptory 
norms described in section II, and cannot procure cessation and reparation from Israel. In light 
of the deteriorating situation in the OPT, additional measures have been recommended by the 
Heads of EU Missions since 2010;102
 
 these have yet to be approved by the European 
Commission.  
29. In conclusion, all other States fail to perform their legal obligations or are complicit in 
Israel’s serious breaches. These States are themselves responsible for internationally 
wrongful conduct. They incur the additional obligations to cease all unlawful recognition, 
aid or assistance in the commission and maintenance of Israel’s unlawful settlement 
enterprise, and to make reparation (see paragraph 25). However, in a situation where many 
powerful States do not cease their wrongful conduct, other States lack the power and 
mechanisms to procure performance of this obligation from such States. Consequently, no 
State is held accountable for conducting “business as usual” with Israel by ignoring treaty 
obligations, failing to cooperate and take effective measures to end its serious breaches, or by 
providing unlawful recognition, aid or assistance. The resulting international climate of 
lawlessness and complicity is the environment that provides Israel with impunity and in 
which Israel’s settlement enterprise thrives.   
   
                                                        
101 Main difficulties include the determination of the place of origin of Israeli goods, and the policy of the State 
of Israel to counteract the effect of this EU measure by granting subsidies to Israeli companies for settlement 
goods which incur customs duties upon entry into the EU. See, S. Peretz, “Lying on the Fence”, Globes, 27-28 
February 2006; Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, Third Annual Review on Human Rights in EU-
Israel Relations: Accommodating to the ‘special’ case of Israel 2005-2006, June 2007.  See also, Bill Van 
Esveld, “An Unsettling Situation; What the EU should tell Israel, and itself, about settlements, trade and the 
destruction of EU aid”, Human Rights Watch, 11 May 2012, at: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/11/unsettling-situation  
102 See, EU Heads of Mission Report on East Jerusalem 2011 (not officially published). Recommendations to 
reinforce EU policy include for the Commission to propose appropriate EU legislation to prevent/discourage 
financial transactions with Israeli entities involved in settlement activity; to compile voluntary guidelines for EU 
tour operators to prevent cooperation with Israeli settlement business in East Jerusalem; and to share information 
on violent settlers in order to assess whether to grant entry into EU Member States. 
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A quick guide through the ILC Articles on State Responsibility  
Annex 
 
Note: the ILC Articles lay out the general rules of international law concerned with the responsibility 
of States for internationally wrongful conduct. They leave aside and do not prejudice, issues of the 
responsibility arising from the special rules of international organisations, or of other non-state entities 
or persons, including individual responsibility for international crimes.   
 
The rules codified in the ILC Articles cover the whole field of state responsibility; they are not limited 
to breaches of obligations of a bilateral character, e.g. under a bilateral treaty with another State. They 
apply to the whole spectrum of the international obligations of States, whether the obligation is 
owed to one or several States, to an individual or group, or to the international community as a 
whole.103
 
  
This quick guide serves as an introduction to the law for those unfamiliar with it, and as a tool 
facilitating reference to the ILC Articles. Rules and comments of special importance to the topic of 
this memorandum are highlighted. 
 
 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53rd session, in 2001,  
and submitted to the General Assembly (A/56/10) 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf 
 
 
Part One THE INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT OF A STATE 
defining the general conditions necessary for State responsibility to arise.  
 
Chapter I  General Principles (Articles 1 - 3): 
every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of 
that State (Article 1). A State is responsible for internationally wrongful conduct, if (i) 
the particular conduct is attributable to the State under international law; and, (ii) 
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that State (Article 2) under treaty 
or customary law, and a State’s internal law is irrelevant for the characterisation of an 
act as internationally wrongful (Article 3). Existence of loss or damage104 or the 
intention to cause harm,105
Chapter II  Attribution of Conduct to a State (Articles 4 -11): 
 are not necessary elements of State responsibility.  
 conduct of all official organs that make up the State under its internal law is 
attributable to the State; conduct of public and private entities, persons, and insurgent 
movements is also attributable to the State if the conditions laid out these Articles are 
met. 
Chapter III Breach of an International Obligation (Articles 12 – 15): provides the rules under 
which conduct by a State amounts to a breach of an international obligation. Article 
15 deals with breaches consisting of a composite act; it explains that serious breaches 
of peremptory norms are likely to be composite breaches. (See Part Two, Chapter III). 
Chapter IV  Responsibility of a State in Connection with the Act of Another State (Articles 16 
– 19): provides that treaty obligations may give rise to responsibility in connection                                                         
103 ILC Articles, General Commentary 4 (d) and 5. See also, ILC Articles 57 and 58. 
104 ILC Article 2, comment 9. 
105 ILC Article 2, comment 10.  
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with the wrongful act of another State. A State also becomes responsible for the 
wrongful conduct of another State, if it provides aid or assistance in commission of 
the wrongful act (Article 16) or exercises direction or control, or coercion. Other than 
that, no legal responsibility arises for a State in connection with the wrongful act of 
another State – unless the situation is one of serious breaches, in particular serious 
breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law.106
Chapter V  Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness (Articles 20 – 27): 
 
(Note: Article 16 is not to be confused with Article 41/ii.  
a breach of an international obligation of a State may not be wrongful if it is carried 
out with the consent of the other State concerned; in self-defense, as a 
“countermeasure” (see Articles 49 - 54); or in situations of force majeure, distress, or 
necessity. A State has no valid defenses against the wrongfulness of an act in response 
to situations caused partially or entirely by its own conduct, and the use of force must 
in all cases be proportional and in conformity with the UN Charter. A State may not 
take recourse to measures which are absolutely prohibited under its treaty obligations, 
and nothing precludes the wrongfulness of conduct which violates a peremptory norm 
(Article 26). 
 
Part Two CONTENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE 
defines the legal consequences for the responsible State of its internationally wrongful 
act 
 
Chapter I General principles, including general rules concerning cessation and reparation 
(Articles 28 – 33): a State responsible for internationally wrongful conduct has a legal 
obligation to: (i) perform the breached; (ii) cease the wrongful conduct and offer 
appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition; and (iii) make full reparation 
for any damage caused, whether moral or material, through restitution, compensation 
and satisfaction. A State’s internal law may not be used as justification for failure to 
comply with these obligations (Article 32). 
Chapter II  Reparation for Injury (Articles 34 – 39): focuses on the forms of reparation 
(restitution, compensation, satisfaction) and the relations between them. Restitution, 
i.e., to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, 
is the primary form of reparation required from the responsible State, to the extent 
that (i) it is not materially impossible, and (ii) does not involve a burden out of all 
proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation (Article 
35). Restitution, is of particular importance where the obligation breached is of a 
continuing character, and even more, so where it arises under a peremptory norm of 
general international law, for example in the case of unlawful annexation of a State.107
Chapter III  Serious Breaches under Peremptory Norms of General International Law 
(Articles 40, 41): deals with the special situation which arises in case of such 
breaches. Article 40 provides that a breach is serious if it involves a gross or 
systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation and explains the 
meaning of these terms. Article 41 explains the legal consequences for States other 
than the responsible State: all States have a legal obligation to (i) cooperate to bring 
to an end through lawful means any such serious breach, and (ii) not to recognise 
as lawful a situation created by the breach, nor render aid or assistance in 
maintaining that situation. 
 
                                                        
106 ILC Articles, Part One, Chapter IV, comment 9. 
107 ILC Article 35, comment 6 
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Because of the diversity of circumstances which could possibly be involved, the 
provision does not prescribe in detail what form this cooperation should take. What is 
called for is a joint and coordinated effort by all States to counteract the effects of 
these breaches, and it is made clear that the obligation to cooperate applies to States 
whether or not they are individually affected by the serious breach.108 Recognition not 
only refers to formal recognition, but also prohibits acts which would imply such 
recognition.109 The prohibition on aid or assistance in this context goes beyond the 
provisions of Article 16. It deals with conduct “after the fact” which assists the 
responsible State in maintaining a situation “opposable to all States in the sense of 
barring erga omnes the legality of a situation which is maintained in violation of 
international law”. It extends beyond the commission of the serious breach itself to 
the maintenance of the situation created by that breach, and it applies whether or 
not the breach itself is a continuing one. Moreover, the concept of aid or assistance 
in Article 16 presupposes that the State has “knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act”. There is no need to mention such a requirement in 
Article 41/ii, as it is hardly conceivable that a State would not have notice of the 
commission of a serious breach by another State.110
 
 
Part Three THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF A 
STATE: identifies the State or States which may react to an internationally wrongful act and specifies 
the modalities by which this may be done.   
Chapter I Invocation of the Responsibility of a State (Articles 42 – 48): 
“Injured” and other States entitled to invoke the responsibility of a State are defined in 
Articles 42, 46, and 48. If more than one State is injured by the same wrongful act, 
each State may invoke responsibility separately (Article 46). Any State other than the 
injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State, if (i) the 
obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is 
established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or (ii) the 
obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole (Article 48). 
Also provided are the rules of: notice/claim for States that wish to invoke the 
responsibility of another State (Article 43); admissibility of claims (Article 44); loss of 
the right to invoke claims (Article 45); and for cases where the responsibility of more 
than one State may be invoked to the same internationally wrongful act (Article 47). 
Any State entitled to invoke responsibility may claim and take lawful measures to 
procure from the responsible State: (i) cessation of the internationally wrongful act, 
and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition; and (ii) reparation for itself (Article 
43; reserved for injured States) or in the interest of the injured State or the 
beneficiaries of the obligation breached (Article 48). 
Chapter II Countermeasures (Articles 49 – 54): deals with the conditions for and limitations on 
the taking of countermeasures mainly by an injured State, but also for States acting 
under Article 48. Countermeasures (reprisals, sanctions) are defined as measures of a 
State that would be unlawful, if they were not taken in response to an 
internationally wrongful act in order to procure cessation and reparation,111
                                                        
108 ILC Article 41, comment 2 and 3. 
 i.e., 
they are to distinguished from material breaches of a treaty. Countermeasures must 
respect the provisions of the UN Charter regarding the threat/use of force, 
109 ILC Article 41, comment 5. 
110 ILC Article 41, comment 11. 
111 ILC Articles, Part Three, Chapter II, comment 1, 4 and 8. 
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fundamental human rights, humanitarian obligations and peremptory norms (Article 
50), and they must be proportional (Article 51). Any injured State is entitled to 
undertake countermeasures against a State responsible for wrongful conduct which 
has not complied with the obligation of cessation and reparation (Article 49). All 
States acting under Article 48 may take countermeasures in the terms of Article 54, 
in order to procure cessation and reparation of a serious breach of a peremptory norm. 
Although States often do so in the framework of international organisations, such as 
under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a State may also take individual 
countermeasures, or as a group of States. Some examples of such countermeasures are 
provided in Article 54. 
 
Part Four GENERAL PROVISIONS 
contains a number of general provisions applicable to the articles as a whole, 
specifying either their scope or certain matters not dealt with (Articles 55 – 59). The 
provisions make clear that where a matter dealt with in the Articles is governed by a 
special rule (lex specialis, e.g. treaties) the latter prevail (Article 55), and that the 
Articles are not exhaustive (Article 56). Article 57 excludes from the scope of the 
Articles questions concerning the responsibility of international organisations and of 
States for the acts of international organisations. It is also made clear that the 
Articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility (Article 
58), or to the provisions of the UN Charter (Article 59). 
 
